About anti-SoftICE tricks

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<TD><PRE>Method 01
=========
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This method of detection of SoftICE (as well as the following one) is
used by the majority of packers/encryptors found on Internet.
5 m: Y/ n! Z* ?7 h# ~' lIt seeks the signature of BoundsChecker in SoftICE
9 e0 q" O5 c8 z0 v: I; i, c* e
9 v' \# F8 u0 Y5 d& E% U/ w    mov     ebp, 04243484Bh        ; 'BCHK'
) r; T+ b) b# f# \4 T7 ^    mov     ax, 04h
" u+ K2 C/ P7 K3 G$ D* ~  A    int     3      
2 I& l$ }/ D3 \' [$ U9 b6 F. G* b    cmp     al,4
$ [3 n/ A( X1 H4 K. y( g    jnz     SoftICE_Detected

) _  `; A; U$ [5 C& G! `3 H( O___________________________________________________________________________

Method 02
3 s" y- R4 S6 f5 L9 D=========
, {; |) t) n3 N% Q5 K9 W
Still a method very much used (perhaps the most frequent one).  It is used
to get SoftICE 'Back Door commands' which gives infos on Breakpoints,
or execute SoftICE commands...
It is also used to crash SoftICE and to force it to execute any commands
(HBOOT...) :-((  

$ l6 p* g4 i) b$ QHere is a quick description:
$ c# K; g8 N; n4 u-AX = 0910h   (Display string in SIce windows)
-AX = 0911h   (Execute SIce commands -command is displayed is ds:dx)
, x' Q, g2 X9 d7 S' ~  H-AX = 0912h   (Get breakpoint infos)
-AX = 0913h   (Set Sice breakpoints)
-AX = 0914h   (Remove SIce breakoints)

Each time you'll meet this trick, you'll see:
: B7 `% `  b1 S7 B/ Q7 z+ r4 R-SI = 4647h
-DI = 4A4Dh
# h! F* B; M- n. QWhich are the 'magic values' used by SoftIce.
" C; p- j4 u" F: G& W' eFor more informations, see "Ralf Brown Interrupt list" chapter int 03h.
, ~) g. O6 J$ j. k7 `5 i9 P
Here is one example from the file "Haspinst.exe" which is the dongle HASP
Envelope utility use to protect DOS applications:
8 e# f2 [  n3 v0 P% `4 Y% ~
$ x7 @& f  v  c; B9 s4 X! K7 U- F
) ?) M/ r5 z! L' I0 L! |- {& C, \4C19:0095   MOV    AX,0911  ; execute command.
# k6 D4 a; m" u3 c" {; V4C19:0098   MOV    DX,[BX]  ; ds:dx point to the command (see below).
4C19:009A   MOV    SI,4647  ; 1st magic value.
, u+ {8 ~' A$ Y4C19:009D   MOV    DI,4A4D  ; 2nd magic value.
" v& l4 M- m1 N* I# l+ o7 k* g4C19:00A0   INT    3        ; Int call.(if SIce is not loaded, jmp to 00AD*)
4C19:00A1   ADD    BX,02    ; BX+2 to point to next command to execute
0 Y" G. G" Z1 |" [  E) s, K4C19:00A4   INC    CX
: {5 p3 r7 x' }' h2 d4C19:00A5   CMP    CX,06    ; Repeat 6 times  to execute
1 d: d" t5 T. S5 z4C19:00A8   JB     0095     ; 6 different commands.
4C19:00AA   JMP    0002     ; Bad_Guy jmp back.
4C19:00AD   MOV    BX,SP    ; Good_Guy go ahead :)
- a3 \* g1 @- D1 S- V* r/ N
The program will execute 6 different SIce commands located at ds:dx, which
are: LDT, IDT, GDT, TSS, RS, and ...HBOOT.

* the "jmp to 00ADh" is performed via an SEH if the debugger is not loaded.
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Method 03
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% o) \. P( I7 L- Q3 s# o' kLess used method.  It seeks the ID of SoftICE VxD via the int 2Fh/1684h
: K+ t; T# ~% T7 j9 F+ U9 |7 H(API Get entry point)
* j5 W! x7 O6 ^7 d) R( _3 t, Z7 ?        
7 N: ^4 X- t5 B8 t3 Y. u
    xor     di,di
' u, d# a) V' x( [  }6 t    mov     es,di
    mov     ax, 1684h      
6 s  n5 o/ w! h5 X, p    mov     bx, 0202h       ; VxD ID of winice
$ {7 V1 E" g% f  i$ f    int     2Fh
    mov     ax, es          ; ES:DI -&gt; VxD API entry point
, s2 _, T: \/ d6 a! d5 \  E4 z    add     ax, di
    test    ax,ax
7 g: W0 M( \1 V1 p0 I1 j( X2 V) e6 R    jnz     SoftICE_Detected
' S5 f' @& a! @; p" B
___________________________________________________________________________

+ w$ t; Q9 W0 D5 t7 Q) A7 c8 }Method 04
! M5 q) J4 Q: z3 i=========

Method identical to the preceding one except that it seeks the ID of SoftICE
GFX VxD.

    xor     di,di
    mov     es,di
    mov     ax, 1684h      
# `, C6 f7 e  P/ y% S7 U    mov     bx, 7a5Fh       ; VxD ID of SIWVID
0 Z" E7 _* z- H' ~; J5 U! m# r3 i    int     2fh
3 L  C3 P! |" ]    mov     ax, es          ; ES:DI -&gt; VxD API entry point
    add     ax, di
    test    ax,ax
    jnz     SoftICE_Detected
  j# E1 _. _: N
# ]1 Y9 V4 i; m3 X# m& {__________________________________________________________________________
( D7 @% {* |3 i* A# E- A

9 l! i* f' r4 Q' K7 F/ y3 b; n- kMethod 05
=========
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9 {5 ?8 N$ x; \2 |# @  ~/ @Method seeking the 'magic number' 0F386h returned (in ax) by all system
debugger. It calls the int 41h, function 4Fh.
There are several alternatives.  
5 n9 q- J- B  B9 Z1 d+ a
The following one is the simplest:
9 Z( M" d, b' t3 [" I, K
3 w8 [' u# b' d- Y    mov     ax,4fh
1 y+ H" `- _  x4 H3 D    int     41h
    cmp     ax, 0F386
( K( }; `1 C: w0 H8 V' q1 z+ ]  c3 w0 T    jz      SoftICE_detected
. }7 j- @; S7 n0 d$ v% {% s

Next method as well as the following one are 2 examples from Stone's
% _: j: A6 I7 ?2 w; c"stn-wid.zip" (www.cracking.net):
; }( S/ t+ {2 L3 }! D; H
    mov     bx, cs
: b! A1 N- p* ]& F$ J    lea     dx, int41handler2
! W0 d! r8 d4 A$ G! y. s: |0 @    xchg    dx, es:[41h*4]
6 N- Y! B+ R% c- W1 X* q    xchg    bx, es:[41h*4+2]
    mov     ax,4fh
    int     41h
    xchg    dx, es:[41h*4]
    xchg    bx, es:[41h*4+2]
. F& u8 {( q) H    cmp     ax, 0f386h
    jz      SoftICE_detected
6 K7 d  J% K& b: \/ C  X& v# C
9 V1 w4 l$ H) J9 o; oint41handler2 PROC
    iret
int41handler2 ENDP
$ S+ J: a$ c$ P* ^. f

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5 R& c" z% \9 ?( J

" s" l' B" Q- M- x- P# nMethod 06
=========
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+ q& M- J$ g/ a  s
) K* i- E% M7 p) \+ Z$ K* k2nd method similar to the preceding one but more difficult to detect:
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$ ^. `2 f2 J$ X' ]* V
int41handler PROC
1 y+ n. f2 A) \- K5 Z+ b    mov     cl,al
    iret
int41handler ENDP

. y- a0 P3 W0 c8 B$ W
    xor     ax,ax
4 J$ [5 t% D- r4 Y/ K: @+ J) ?    mov     es,ax
    mov     bx, cs
    lea     dx, int41handler
- e1 t9 a8 [7 z    xchg    dx, es:[41h*4]
    xchg    bx, es:[41h*4+2]
3 O, d7 r7 L6 Q4 |8 E    in      al, 40h
8 D( n* X8 H) q4 ~, B' p    xor     cx,cx
' c4 y; _- `' B: w    int     41h
    xchg    dx, es:[41h*4]
  {' t8 V  r% a/ u+ Q* ^    xchg    bx, es:[41h*4+2]
    cmp     cl,al
# ^) |0 N7 ^8 P8 k, z    jnz     SoftICE_detected

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Method 07
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- x/ S9 J: A, K3 U' F7 {' KMethod of detection of the WinICE handler in the int68h (V86)

    mov     ah,43h
: t7 y3 \" \* U/ q6 {. t9 Z# G    int     68h
    cmp     ax,0F386h
% ], n. n+ [+ ^' `. O$ n    jz      SoftICE_Detected


=&gt; it is not possible to set a BPINT 68 with softice but you can hook a 32Bit
7 s: s. O5 _7 B; ?# ~/ b   app like this:

   BPX exec_int if ax==68
   (function called is located at byte ptr [ebp+1Dh] and client eip is
# P4 S2 ?7 j' J: K   located at [ebp+48h] for 32Bit apps)
* N0 Z) }) I3 R* v2 S__________________________________________________________________________
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Method 08
=========
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It is not a method of detection of SoftICE but a possibility to crash the
! R; h% {, Y& `3 x" A  e* }. Qsystem by intercepting int 01h and int 03h and redirecting them to another
/ E0 I# {. ^" E/ T: [" W; qroutine.
2 F6 m' a8 B9 u2 GIt calls int 21h functions 25h and 35h (set/get int vector) and ds:dx points
to the new routine to execute (hangs computer...)

    mov     ah, 25h
    mov     al, Int_Number (01h or 03h)
    mov     dx, offset New_Int_Routine
" d& |! Y: F2 i- s  ]    int     21h
+ p" z, ^- D) O% a5 c
  S! y/ E) n- z__________________________________________________________________________
8 h2 u$ f/ g* N; z# c# |; l
Method 09
" }6 M- @/ |7 a. y=========

This method is closed to methods 03 and 04 (int 2Fh/1684h) but it is only
0 A; i) r5 q2 Operformed in ring0 (VxD or a ring3 app using the VxdCall).
The Get_DDB service is used to determine whether or not a VxD is installed
5 T) B7 M/ Q, k$ o/ r6 Xfor the specified device and returns a Device Description Block (in ecx) for
that device if it is installed.
, {' N. T* ]) @& j
   mov     eax, Device_ID   ; 202h for SICE or 7a5Fh for SIWVID VxD ID
+ ~1 m+ G+ m& \; U( b+ n$ n- r$ t   mov     edi, Device_Name ; only used if no VxD ID (useless in our case ;-)
   VMMCall Get_DDB
   mov     [DDB], ecx       ; ecx=DDB or 0 if the VxD is not installed
$ K5 r4 w0 b6 v* x7 b* N3 k
) d9 n! {6 ~* S9 RNote as well that you can easily detect this method with SoftICE:
   bpx Get_DDB if ax==0202 || ax==7a5fh

__________________________________________________________________________

/ f, w0 x* L% `$ w/ {  O. y( QMethod 10
=========

=&gt;Disable or clear breakpoints before using this feature. DO NOT trace with
  SoftICE while the option is enable!!
8 H! }7 X) j) e, t5 T
This trick is very efficient:
3 k8 x# I: j+ N/ N2 R0 eby checking the Debug Registers, you can detect if SoftICE is loaded
/ @7 V! `5 t9 G4 [: W9 `(dr7=0x700 if you loaded the soft with SoftICE loader, 0x400 otherwise) or if
4 q6 D- u1 ]8 p% l6 k! @+ l% \: x" Cthere are some memory breakpoints set (dr0 to dr3) simply by reading their
) q  ]4 `* h5 K& x0 m8 d4 g" m0 Nvalue (in ring0 only). Values can be manipulated and or changed as well
(clearing BPMs for instance)

6 _9 o% J  H1 b; P2 k* D4 w__________________________________________________________________________
" V7 Q, S' o1 q' ^5 `5 I
5 S# ^1 p4 {  iMethod 11
# D+ x6 y( x- c  |* i! s=========

$ }: l  P3 p5 B) J+ {This method is most known as 'MeltICE' because it has been freely distributed
via www.winfiles.com. However it was first used by NuMega people to allow
$ r2 Z# f) X: X+ H( h$ I1 JSymbol Loader to check if SoftICE was active or not (the code is located
inside nmtrans.dll).
! w; A- H% c  M0 J
  W+ Y! P6 C7 o$ GThe way it works is very simple:
. {; C1 }6 E1 o! _It tries to open SoftICE drivers handles (SICE, SIWVID for Win9x, NTICE for
4 `  s1 X; J+ H$ PWinNT) with the CreateFileA API.
' i' C9 V" L7 b
Here is a sample (checking for 'SICE'):
% r) _/ v+ U9 T, f1 h  F
! C7 R; P* a/ A0 _7 J* H% WBOOL IsSoftIce95Loaded()
{
   HANDLE hFile;  
& h" V4 h. G0 I6 ^) P! }   hFile = CreateFile( "\\\\.\\SICE", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0 o* b* _, L+ Z6 H1 h9 E                      FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                      NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
7 r+ }* u9 L+ \5 Q/ ^' b% G   if( hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )
" U2 U7 U9 w6 C5 {! p) m   {
. i+ p: l" W6 g0 d      CloseHandle(hFile);
4 C/ s8 ?: l6 d& {* h' j$ [; @      return TRUE;
   }
   return FALSE;
$ d! V: M4 q( c8 D}

6 e: k! F" G0 m. p6 @2 h+ ?6 zAlthough this trick calls the CreateFileA function, don't even expect to be
able to intercept it by installing a IFS hook: it will not work, no way!
In fact, after the call to CreateFileA it will get through VWIN32 0x001F
service _VWIN32_ReleaseWin32Mutex (via Kernel32!ORD_0001/VxDCall function)
: N$ e$ ?8 U* Yand then browse the DDB list until it find the VxD and its DDB_Control_Proc
7 w- j  C# Z' ~. z: @5 u/ W8 q9 Lfield.
3 {. U; j7 \  n6 O5 m+ Z3 s# p+ oIn fact, its purpose is not to load/unload VxDs but only to send a
W32_DEVICEIOCONTROL (0x23) control message (DIOC_OPEN and DIOC_CLOSEHANDLE)
0 G# W* Q6 s$ C" V# r  d) qto the VxD Control_Dispatch proc (how the hell a shareware soft could try
to load/unload a non-dynamically loadable driver such as SoftICE ;-).
If the VxD is loaded, it will always clear eax and the Carry flag to allow
, S1 _# ?. K+ S. I: ]: r+ `: [its handle to be opened and then, will be detected.
You can check that simply by hooking Winice.exe control proc entry point
while running MeltICE.

' J- G! s" \* L3 ]' w6 y" p( t# _
% a$ }& r  V0 u+ f2 Y  00401067:  push      00402025    ; \\.\SICE
2 a) O- T/ ?& b  A  0040106C:  call      CreateFileA
7 c* I% E3 C# Q  00401071:  cmp       eax,-001
  00401074:  je        00401091
! A9 P: ]2 j+ |, U% U
8 p) k7 \" r8 U) E2 p
There could be hundreds of BPX you could use to detect this trick.
-The most classical one is:
! H3 n1 V& I: K0 `  BPX CreateFileA if *(esp-&gt;4+4)=='SICE' || *(esp-&gt;4+4)=='SIWV' ||
3 O5 n8 L/ `! Y, F: S6 X    *(esp-&gt;4+4)=='NTIC'

-The most exotic ones (could be very slooooow :-(
+ S4 y) P+ \% ^" d4 Q8 B& ?   BPINT 30 if eax==002A001F &amp;&amp; (*edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV')  
% L# f) x* w; ~- ?! v     ;will break 3 times :-(

3 F* _. M( K7 ?, B4 D/ _3 M/ l$ `-or (a bit) faster:
# n! e! f7 ?/ S  a   BPINT 30 if (*edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV')

   BPX KERNEL32!ORD_0001 if *edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV'  
     ;will break 3 times :-(

, g  `& O5 L6 P2 Q: }' o-Much faster:
   BPX VMM_GetDDBList if eax-&gt;3=='SICE' || eax-&gt;3=='SIWV'

Note also that some programs (like AZPR3.00) use de old 16-bit _lopen
function to do the same job:
4 i# S2 ^  T8 }$ C1 R
   push    00                        ; OF_READ
   mov     eax,[00656634]            ; '\\.\SICE',0
   push    eax
2 q, t) D) V8 m; M/ X( B   call    KERNEL32!_lopen
- Y" ~0 A1 Q- F   inc     eax
8 @6 g1 t/ w8 d* T& }* p% B   jnz     00650589                  ; detected
   push    00                        ; OF_READ
& b* f' _  c5 D6 }4 I5 g, G  e4 V2 m   mov     eax,[00656638]            ; '\\.\SICE'
   push    eax
   call    KERNEL32!_lopen
   inc     eax
   jz      006505ae                  ; not detected


0 Q7 y+ L$ }5 x__________________________________________________________________________
& ^8 |) x% X) {: z! P, {2 }+ G
4 G1 f' f, e# ]1 a; o: l2 BMethod 12
  t! Q5 }' |3 m: }5 A  b/ ~=========
  v6 x( c& ?; B
This trick is similar to int41h/4fh Debugger installation check (code 05
&amp; 06) but very limited because it's only available for Win95/98 (not NT)
3 A+ r! O$ @6 j7 ]as it uses the VxDCall backdoor. This detection was found in Bleem Demo.
; f* N/ {5 Z' X; a. W5 {& i; l
/ j" h9 p) h) |   push  0000004fh         ; function 4fh
   push  002a002ah         ; high word specifies which VxD (VWIN32)
; i( T7 n: M3 }& P3 y1 C/ d" r& K                           ; low word specifies which service
                             (VWIN32_Int41Dispatch)
  \' O& ^3 [% R   call  Kernel32!ORD_001  ; VxdCall
8 c% q) t5 `  L0 D  L' G   cmp   ax, 0f386h        ; magic number returned by system debuggers
   jz    SoftICE_detected

$ v: T! w( ?7 _2 SHere again, several ways to detect it:

9 W) E3 L/ |! a6 k* u5 ~    BPINT 41 if ax==4f
+ g+ x  _; D5 [; t, Z6 n& l
2 o( q, h3 f- O! ]) t8 c    BPINT 30 if ax==0xF386   ; SoftICE must be loaded for this one
" ]8 ^+ s) u+ p
! i& l: E' k1 f5 m2 R) k    BPX Exec_PM_Int if eax==41 &amp;&amp; edx-&gt;1c==4f &amp;&amp; edx-&gt;10==002A002A

, |% B. v1 V( T1 v! ~( r+ G    BPX Kernel32!ord_0001 if esp-&gt;4==002A002A &amp;&amp; esp-&gt;8==4f   ; slooooow!
$ n8 Q6 B, `- I. P, m' Z
__________________________________________________________________________

Method 13
=========

9 k2 o# b3 M, V# e9 x- h" zNot a real method of detection, but a good way to know if SoftICE is
1 u# ?9 Z5 ], f: minstalled on a computer and to locate its installation directory.
- i0 V/ N' V. a8 b. IIt is used by few softs which access the following registry keys (usually #2) :
4 y9 L/ O9 X# Q& j
-#1: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\Uninstall\SoftICE
-#2: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\NuMega\SoftICE
8 \) G) @+ D3 M1 _-#3: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\App Paths\Loader32.Exe


4 c( f5 Q  \# V0 j7 Z( B( DNote that some nasty apps could then erase all files from SoftICE directory
(I faced that once :-(

6 ?  u* C+ K. HUseful breakpoint to detect it:
/ }! s1 E+ \9 X; T" ?  M
3 w' _; u: {  a# h, _* G     BPX _regopenkey if *(esp-&gt;8+0x13)=='tICE' || *(esp-&gt;8+0x37)=='tICE'

8 @/ g/ D6 x  C- L6 l__________________________________________________________________________

3 G/ p# Y9 {4 X/ q6 I& D3 s
Method 14
/ q1 R% p$ c' V1 ~# H/ ^=========

A call to VMM 'Test_Debug_Installed' service. As the name says, its purpose
is to determines whether a debugger is running on your system (ring0 only).

1 }, T+ W6 \6 l! J* n) i) \$ ~. p   VMMCall Test_Debug_Installed
   je      not_installed

1 w" i& R+ I. \2 G: gThis service just checks a flag.
9 a6 Y% }, A1 n  m1 D3 X7 t</PRE></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>