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1 @; d- r1 M. l! h9 N<TD><PRE>Method 01
5 M( J& [# W, L9 o; j8 u% P; |$ P=========7 B% J% G% g( z T: t, E/ l1 e
3 p5 R9 \+ r2 Z4 p/ \& dThis method of detection of SoftICE (as well as the following one) is
7 O$ s3 |% k; l" n8 m. k Fused by the majority of packers/encryptors found on Internet.
2 n# r- i8 K/ F1 S6 [# PIt seeks the signature of BoundsChecker in SoftICE
7 c; s) s' q f' m# c" B: \. s
. x- ]; n N& @' j6 N mov ebp, 04243484Bh ; 'BCHK'0 g' F3 A: _# i7 l% D) M/ ~- e& `
mov ax, 04h X2 Z( H+ w; v) S5 ?4 `
int 3
4 h( J# R% k4 f- Y cmp al,4* H6 n# J+ |2 I( z2 D$ b& G0 n
jnz SoftICE_Detected
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8 |0 Y% w' y3 K1 G% W) u( w+ x___________________________________________________________________________3 n" E$ @: J. I5 L9 s
; Q$ j4 H7 n+ m9 F' O" S, i
Method 021 f' x+ Y; w% \+ q
=========" S7 ?9 L6 B8 V: z: y/ \
# q) I6 G7 O: D& h2 v) @% KStill a method very much used (perhaps the most frequent one). It is used
& [9 g/ ]/ }( E" I/ i+ ^# p+ k$ W7 Lto get SoftICE 'Back Door commands' which gives infos on Breakpoints,8 e, n* e) Z& M
or execute SoftICE commands...* e$ C1 c2 a& Q+ N: i
It is also used to crash SoftICE and to force it to execute any commands
/ C3 l3 N. {4 a ~( J0 G1 w& V(HBOOT...) :-((
7 d3 x1 J% E2 l2 a) R& S" W3 C3 o' Y$ r" i# `; c, ~7 e
Here is a quick description:
, j* k- B$ p) F-AX = 0910h (Display string in SIce windows)
% T# ~; a. s, x-AX = 0911h (Execute SIce commands -command is displayed is ds:dx)
+ N; A" }0 x) R9 D& P3 |: u2 D-AX = 0912h (Get breakpoint infos)% u' H: Q9 M9 L: t
-AX = 0913h (Set Sice breakpoints)
4 @# [6 g9 B, N$ n# I- u-AX = 0914h (Remove SIce breakoints)# W+ U7 G m$ z! B0 R
8 a# B$ `# i$ u5 E& [5 h& @Each time you'll meet this trick, you'll see:3 r" |) w0 `4 @0 [ ~4 n. r/ a4 }! Q/ ~9 b
-SI = 4647h
' f' G9 x& V, Q9 B4 H-DI = 4A4Dh
( x, [+ B7 M, z- v' q qWhich are the 'magic values' used by SoftIce.$ a, T0 m* x8 J( R. E3 |* n, m, O
For more informations, see "Ralf Brown Interrupt list" chapter int 03h.7 w$ V/ a: R6 I" d
- e; E6 |* l7 M' S
Here is one example from the file "Haspinst.exe" which is the dongle HASP
3 G2 f7 O) R5 L& EEnvelope utility use to protect DOS applications:; E6 ]7 A. ^ m, j+ s8 G
. ]& }& N1 y% n, ^! l' z. i0 M+ l' _- r( F
4C19:0095 MOV AX,0911 ; execute command.& D- p4 a" n8 ~5 \% e7 b0 {) G& `
4C19:0098 MOV DX,[BX] ; ds:dx point to the command (see below).; d& P/ t3 J3 L, e* l
4C19:009A MOV SI,4647 ; 1st magic value.4 U0 a# Y( N4 E) U
4C19:009D MOV DI,4A4D ; 2nd magic value.+ d2 \" @* `/ {
4C19:00A0 INT 3 ; Int call.(if SIce is not loaded, jmp to 00AD*)' h& H+ q# p, A% ~2 i& X' l4 c
4C19:00A1 ADD BX,02 ; BX+2 to point to next command to execute
* g- A; n* o7 H% @2 s4C19:00A4 INC CX* u; t1 \* x/ ]( U0 i! [7 O
4C19:00A5 CMP CX,06 ; Repeat 6 times to execute! `0 d. W. S! e+ w% {
4C19:00A8 JB 0095 ; 6 different commands.1 h) S' c! G: t
4C19:00AA JMP 0002 ; Bad_Guy jmp back.
3 u! d. q( V; |* w" p4C19:00AD MOV BX,SP ; Good_Guy go ahead :)9 Y5 T) { p4 {8 l
% z6 U9 |9 m9 U7 D: c: gThe program will execute 6 different SIce commands located at ds:dx, which' D; n6 G& y/ D) N, ]
are: LDT, IDT, GDT, TSS, RS, and ...HBOOT.
3 p0 D" ^! e0 o; u( y, f4 \" n1 J& D4 s. F
* the "jmp to 00ADh" is performed via an SEH if the debugger is not loaded.
X, ?5 v6 x Q4 K9 S# [3 b___________________________________________________________________________6 {2 s7 g/ N' p- F5 F5 n
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Method 03/ |' l: @9 G8 _7 }% N K+ S# T
=========$ b4 a. D9 c- k3 E: [/ T% S1 [* ^6 f
; q3 D- G% x5 j. LLess used method. It seeks the ID of SoftICE VxD via the int 2Fh/1684h3 k8 t* K& P; j: Q4 x
(API Get entry point)
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% ~. Q2 T6 m2 [# f
xor di,di* Y! a3 o/ g; w6 G, M! W& E
mov es,di
) z4 Y! U- O: F mov ax, 1684h & _+ m |2 K% A
mov bx, 0202h ; VxD ID of winice, V8 r1 K. I7 y& c
int 2Fh+ S! T: p3 E% [5 v$ d2 o0 N
mov ax, es ; ES:DI -> VxD API entry point1 U4 h* S- E: r M' K H2 x3 ~
add ax, di. }; [, ]' x6 w! O" {+ c( `
test ax,ax7 |, E3 g, w- I
jnz SoftICE_Detected4 L/ U! ~1 r. ` S0 ]3 M/ S
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___________________________________________________________________________
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- ?8 N0 ~ R4 f( F( f! T' ~5 B3 S3 `Method 04* j4 f( U" B/ ?: M5 ]& n$ Y6 S* q
=========* L$ g5 x) r; W3 }2 h
, c6 H/ R" R% D) k9 u9 N9 DMethod identical to the preceding one except that it seeks the ID of SoftICE
3 q* i8 n, y( i0 L8 N: X% c: i6 CGFX VxD.% Y7 z, s% a+ m3 J! o F
7 n& y' o5 @) |7 o5 P$ y
xor di,di
9 M7 d8 y5 D, O$ F& E mov es,di3 L* H7 `0 \% S: g$ Y3 i0 U( G. Z
mov ax, 1684h
8 E. o8 M4 w/ X6 w4 { mov bx, 7a5Fh ; VxD ID of SIWVID. y. M8 n8 ?1 d! a! ~) c
int 2fh5 B; D" k+ I+ A
mov ax, es ; ES:DI -> VxD API entry point0 C0 [" S3 _! {0 u
add ax, di
9 I# S1 q0 s9 h. b( D7 I5 A6 m; K test ax,ax. h! G$ ^2 C d/ C
jnz SoftICE_Detected
# {/ p( ]5 e& k
" }+ P5 o; o9 x9 h% Y2 Z& V+ L' T__________________________________________________________________________
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Method 05( o1 w5 n$ z+ }. v0 l% H2 H, c- |9 S
=========. F0 Y% |8 W/ y
0 f$ b& h' q- H! W, f& w9 s
Method seeking the 'magic number' 0F386h returned (in ax) by all system
! q7 W6 _- R2 u( I! tdebugger. It calls the int 41h, function 4Fh.' `' i3 z& a# u' I# C
There are several alternatives. 4 M4 E' p5 E7 x f) j) n1 [/ x
( T& i) ?, w2 n0 G; j! c4 b6 v) ]3 z. [The following one is the simplest:
0 F( [$ c! N" M5 i8 Y
# Q9 Q& \% q3 h4 ?6 W mov ax,4fh" S8 h- @, j, [2 h$ U1 V7 C1 s
int 41h" [! C) S# O6 x5 L) q+ f. l
cmp ax, 0F386
% Y' S$ x' Q; V6 L$ i/ Q jz SoftICE_detected
( B+ x) E( f; `1 h7 ?1 d. W
4 ?- ~- g0 s- f4 C' c8 m
( [5 v: r* i- pNext method as well as the following one are 2 examples from Stone's 1 r$ E7 {* U: k# _$ k2 `
"stn-wid.zip" (www.cracking.net):2 U0 I* r* q3 h1 ~6 Z) r; |) p+ U
) w& ^* l6 x6 S$ f" X1 Q& _ mov bx, cs
3 c9 S$ e$ }) }6 G( h lea dx, int41handler2
4 }! h6 R, ~; t C xchg dx, es:[41h*4]( q- Y6 W/ O1 \2 D1 U* t9 p- ]
xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]& A8 L. g" ]+ }$ X7 ~; u# m! W+ c
mov ax,4fh
1 }& C) Q3 _1 n# a# G, |7 f/ n" `7 h int 41h
( R% Q. `, D) ~/ V! L xchg dx, es:[41h*4]
8 D3 r3 U$ j) h. Z6 p) L! \/ A( P xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]$ b l4 A- F4 P; `0 Q
cmp ax, 0f386h
- U: ` B/ i# J4 |8 } jz SoftICE_detected
# Z" D7 C M% }3 p* Q6 J% R
. Q. E' e7 c) t) ?6 jint41handler2 PROC: e1 g" U2 ]5 W& ]
iret$ X1 i; \" J! i" V* Z, O9 t
int41handler2 ENDP
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_________________________________________________________________________
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Method 06, _. y% @# b- m H
=========
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2nd method similar to the preceding one but more difficult to detect:
+ `8 C x- Z" g- R% \/ G! g% [4 _7 y. R& K$ f
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int41handler PROC
& R$ P1 a0 {- C& A! d mov cl,al
/ u, F& y; h+ x! B( M# {) u% e4 n iret% I; O) g( R+ I2 p4 w. J
int41handler ENDP
2 B2 H4 [% p4 q# u7 q
^! l) G7 ~- p3 X" ]
# n7 g( ] U/ I; W8 A1 P xor ax,ax, x( s/ y$ ~" K7 T' F7 y& G
mov es,ax9 W' z3 _# Q7 {) V+ M& b# s: J# C
mov bx, cs
% _! [1 Q6 U, g( d" W" G lea dx, int41handler1 q e. F+ h8 j9 s0 {& m
xchg dx, es:[41h*4]1 v* z& \% d1 Y$ O5 }; Z; B4 T
xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]
# h$ J% Z7 |+ }$ j in al, 40h, z( \. w& a/ d, L
xor cx,cx
4 n9 B5 z4 l& [# w int 41h$ O- x+ F& Z2 c: V
xchg dx, es:[41h*4]9 \$ ^3 O/ Z0 g9 k
xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]
+ }% _ {5 `; ^- P+ @ cmp cl,al) ~9 `8 R, q* V! b# h* A! r" ?
jnz SoftICE_detected
o2 _, ~' `( v% L! l8 {
' C% |3 O2 k, d1 V5 N* O_________________________________________________________________________8 \0 _: C; Y3 j- V7 m* t3 S
8 Q& q1 B0 W) D
Method 07
9 s9 A' a) Z5 Y$ y9 X" N9 l/ y=========
/ X! i5 h) O' O) R
" z& q# B& ^! S j# P: B- }9 wMethod of detection of the WinICE handler in the int68h (V86)
3 [+ P! k8 ]( Z/ K
% l5 v. B. |1 V1 ^0 O5 v mov ah,43h
0 d/ j. s3 G& S' M2 [. M int 68h
, m5 G. J C5 | cmp ax,0F386h3 [1 q0 s5 ]# C q. U
jz SoftICE_Detected
6 \; X Y# H, C9 V4 f. `; b! H0 V0 ]- p' |( j" g5 q" i" Z+ N
3 ?; T @# d: M& ]" q% ~3 o
=> it is not possible to set a BPINT 68 with softice but you can hook a 32Bit& B, c; {9 A8 c* c' x6 Z, ~
app like this:& @! T9 l' d6 R: J0 ^
" k3 L1 X7 O: K ]
BPX exec_int if ax==687 D/ f. d. c+ P" V" E) m4 r
(function called is located at byte ptr [ebp+1Dh] and client eip is, G. O: {- ?4 r' G5 K
located at [ebp+48h] for 32Bit apps)9 w! W3 d( d9 d6 v
__________________________________________________________________________
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' n7 N( W8 v% h5 }) p* G+ zMethod 08+ A( ~% G `0 S3 P/ e
=========
% |- D& O: S. i7 U$ `: p6 ^
7 J; O- D0 l- o- y; ?3 ^It is not a method of detection of SoftICE but a possibility to crash the
1 e. ]/ d0 b; a7 m4 D; Nsystem by intercepting int 01h and int 03h and redirecting them to another
1 e9 G/ {& p8 \0 g) Proutine.
8 f3 v" h' C; `, ~6 `9 K, N) W' GIt calls int 21h functions 25h and 35h (set/get int vector) and ds:dx points
% O1 j0 d& H: c! D2 Qto the new routine to execute (hangs computer...)& c8 l1 _7 o6 W% N! O
$ b2 `% E3 ^/ |8 G mov ah, 25h8 ], a2 ?6 a. j/ f
mov al, Int_Number (01h or 03h)9 p4 r: p; M0 n
mov dx, offset New_Int_Routine
% t. i2 A# E: ~% V7 f int 21h
8 f6 ?0 q, I' k ?7 o* z
% p/ `3 X/ V* R3 R- z6 k3 L% F7 X0 `__________________________________________________________________________
% @1 Y- E' J# @! J4 N% n7 a
# \! D) J7 v& q1 `3 ~6 QMethod 090 ~8 ?5 _! {9 v: C4 G0 {6 E
=========" f! `7 F/ \, ~% q* r+ X2 ?2 z( Y
Q+ C4 S+ Y" U% K G8 v$ O4 yThis method is closed to methods 03 and 04 (int 2Fh/1684h) but it is only9 x" t! `0 ?& s$ T# z( V4 X
performed in ring0 (VxD or a ring3 app using the VxdCall).
5 G1 }8 X2 @' D5 J& b' HThe Get_DDB service is used to determine whether or not a VxD is installed: v: @$ k y( _& D; H) n9 h0 x) y
for the specified device and returns a Device Description Block (in ecx) for
3 W7 U/ a3 V s& Sthat device if it is installed.! m( z8 M4 z1 [3 i4 `$ H
% U4 l- C5 F4 ?) F. D$ F
mov eax, Device_ID ; 202h for SICE or 7a5Fh for SIWVID VxD ID
) E8 t6 j, s0 O' c( t mov edi, Device_Name ; only used if no VxD ID (useless in our case ;-)
6 w! ~/ `: Z4 Z6 K& V5 j VMMCall Get_DDB2 \3 \2 \7 T$ Y+ A
mov [DDB], ecx ; ecx=DDB or 0 if the VxD is not installed" y* N% z- [8 ~$ I# N+ r2 s
z( V: ?/ b) f9 K+ i! _7 }
Note as well that you can easily detect this method with SoftICE:
+ u2 T* A1 T/ R bpx Get_DDB if ax==0202 || ax==7a5fh
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Method 10
8 T. R* N& a9 ]$ q: Y% e' a=========
- {: Q, e7 z1 h3 G6 ^ e% J' m" M3 X0 A: m' R' t0 P) A- Q# p
=>Disable or clear breakpoints before using this feature. DO NOT trace with
! G3 O6 q* r/ W6 D8 w9 z SoftICE while the option is enable!!
9 ^3 S7 e, _6 \! r. Z) R0 H8 v* d, ]. m& e: w
This trick is very efficient:( U7 Q* e) |) A3 ]# `
by checking the Debug Registers, you can detect if SoftICE is loaded
3 V. \/ v6 ?5 a* d j3 g; k; d(dr7=0x700 if you loaded the soft with SoftICE loader, 0x400 otherwise) or if, S/ m4 S2 L- C ?
there are some memory breakpoints set (dr0 to dr3) simply by reading their. T7 d, L3 v. b6 }! O" F
value (in ring0 only). Values can be manipulated and or changed as well
5 M8 f! i" D( y0 o+ ](clearing BPMs for instance)% j( ?! h9 u8 a% e
( k. r9 O2 e! z# Y2 n3 p; R% |! _
__________________________________________________________________________
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- J6 K1 t" }3 j' n! O+ t4 t) [0 x( MMethod 11
" D# i/ g& b/ m$ C7 p* T4 p ?$ t=========) l6 t( D- ~$ s3 Y$ ^: a& v
! q3 O9 {' H. D. L1 W5 X" K
This method is most known as 'MeltICE' because it has been freely distributed
( P4 n2 G5 l1 O" j+ L. i$ f Pvia www.winfiles.com. However it was first used by NuMega people to allow' Z- {# e. f" A5 N, p: s8 a3 Q
Symbol Loader to check if SoftICE was active or not (the code is located
- I+ E3 v% N+ h5 Z. Rinside nmtrans.dll).
& f: A- W! M2 c- o) ?9 r7 o7 S: H- ~; L. R8 w& X
The way it works is very simple:
9 J0 y1 d* o/ b' pIt tries to open SoftICE drivers handles (SICE, SIWVID for Win9x, NTICE for" ]* o; C) z3 r/ k. K# ?+ V
WinNT) with the CreateFileA API.! M6 X. F8 C7 v0 t: d" C: w
2 P! I5 Q- _2 F& ^# C7 i
Here is a sample (checking for 'SICE'):+ e' E& i. L0 W" e9 e! u: R; M$ k; R6 B3 Y
3 @3 d: H' m5 _- J- EBOOL IsSoftIce95Loaded()
& o/ {. ^6 v: r5 ]{
( L o4 C3 n$ K% X" ~ ^ HANDLE hFile; # j* D$ s5 P, w# e. s
hFile = CreateFile( "\\\\.\\SICE", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,6 Z. ?0 Y! F' ?& M( m
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,4 y7 a% z3 v# H7 `3 b
NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);2 x8 u B5 g5 v
if( hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )4 M5 g* ^# p5 L8 J" Q
{7 j: e' z5 q4 t' F' h* K
CloseHandle(hFile);1 O5 T# _6 ]) L, k6 N: P/ \6 j
return TRUE;
! h( c" |7 m2 K# Y5 |* T }5 B# t! S3 |, \3 m9 e( t3 a3 `! B0 C
return FALSE;5 Z: y5 G$ A2 Y6 T/ {1 _4 L. m7 G5 [
}4 I% r" Z# y' T, I1 Q- G
: R/ ` I# c: [* T8 a+ q
Although this trick calls the CreateFileA function, don't even expect to be
! o( `( o) g# }5 W( aable to intercept it by installing a IFS hook: it will not work, no way! _2 a5 D8 l. ^* W0 k! a7 `
In fact, after the call to CreateFileA it will get through VWIN32 0x001F
. i5 g) w) X- K& z0 k4 [2 xservice _VWIN32_ReleaseWin32Mutex (via Kernel32!ORD_0001/VxDCall function)9 ], f7 M2 g: e- r2 x) `7 ^2 ?
and then browse the DDB list until it find the VxD and its DDB_Control_Proc
$ y4 {" q4 b, k/ |2 ffield.3 v8 K6 w0 x% t, q
In fact, its purpose is not to load/unload VxDs but only to send a ( E# L3 l+ j) G7 S4 `% ]
W32_DEVICEIOCONTROL (0x23) control message (DIOC_OPEN and DIOC_CLOSEHANDLE)
0 g& ?" f7 u. N) h" j$ hto the VxD Control_Dispatch proc (how the hell a shareware soft could try$ x' v# l+ y) L; r
to load/unload a non-dynamically loadable driver such as SoftICE ;-).
/ v% G" n# C) |If the VxD is loaded, it will always clear eax and the Carry flag to allow6 i# p9 A( A( |9 J: C6 X
its handle to be opened and then, will be detected.
2 R V- [' c' z' @! A8 p9 uYou can check that simply by hooking Winice.exe control proc entry point
! Z1 B- @* Y) z7 o* x) bwhile running MeltICE.
5 @8 Z! P- h8 F, Z) b* `2 J/ R1 i6 i0 ~( [8 @7 L+ e
$ a$ I0 r3 F- K7 ~) C; ?: w R
00401067: push 00402025 ; \\.\SICE
u- s0 i" A- q 0040106C: call CreateFileA
8 h$ h. m. K A- c$ `+ F# ?6 t 00401071: cmp eax,-001
+ F& O" n, g5 k0 ?: w, J 00401074: je 00401091
( Y h$ ^* |' ?) Q+ _: e8 \
3 C2 v3 @! E7 B- h/ _* r6 A, k% e! _% {4 o4 v
There could be hundreds of BPX you could use to detect this trick.
. V* q% e* p4 h-The most classical one is:
' B" v( e- q, L" t; ~ BPX CreateFileA if *(esp->4+4)=='SICE' || *(esp->4+4)=='SIWV' ||
* r$ g5 Y b2 |) w7 ]$ u8 s *(esp->4+4)=='NTIC'
# M1 D- U, X2 D$ }
; n, i, p2 `. v, i-The most exotic ones (could be very slooooow :-(
& t; f7 [9 @3 v. O3 j, D# b2 @ BPINT 30 if eax==002A001F && (*edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV') * @8 n/ i: _& Z
;will break 3 times :-(
% j+ k C1 U9 r+ A+ u; w
6 \4 O8 o# m, s, L-or (a bit) faster: ( A4 b0 C D4 e, A! C) `- N
BPINT 30 if (*edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV'), q) v. f* \" j6 ^
$ B' Z2 K" J+ J5 M9 ]6 l% s8 Q
BPX KERNEL32!ORD_0001 if *edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV' , ]7 f; B8 L( P# D. j$ f/ @4 u( S8 e
;will break 3 times :-(
; U" G2 _$ `0 K1 h1 i9 t# Z* a/ L8 x( `: i7 n7 e' h
-Much faster:
* {( [1 ^1 e& t* R5 a BPX VMM_GetDDBList if eax->3=='SICE' || eax->3=='SIWV'& {/ V: o7 m2 m8 |0 u1 i
+ x+ ^+ n4 c2 j+ }% J
Note also that some programs (like AZPR3.00) use de old 16-bit _lopen
: I1 {5 D f! Lfunction to do the same job:
, _% b% i0 T& ?* N$ x: q
8 g/ ^+ Q* y6 N- `' U4 a push 00 ; OF_READ$ w9 _" B5 |7 \, G, K
mov eax,[00656634] ; '\\.\SICE',0
0 h" m9 o2 Z% i8 P" l4 p4 @9 L# T push eax
9 _+ E- v. w" T call KERNEL32!_lopen+ D7 P+ |" W! k( F& o
inc eax. X J% |% C, T1 @. {& T
jnz 00650589 ; detected* p! c4 e- R4 s9 V. _3 A4 k
push 00 ; OF_READ
( }" G& j! d, g7 C8 r# S' Z mov eax,[00656638] ; '\\.\SICE'* B$ q. l+ e/ E9 o0 Y
push eax, A/ |& \4 { @) X, e- Q& ?3 C/ ]
call KERNEL32!_lopen n+ x- L- Q( d1 x
inc eax
6 N5 B: {3 L# ?9 ] jz 006505ae ; not detected
( [$ U% G2 b5 T c, f; `5 a2 g: g
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Method 12, Z/ C, U9 S+ j5 S* C& y E
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0 K! y& ?0 ?3 l5 ~& yThis trick is similar to int41h/4fh Debugger installation check (code 051 @; P' m+ {. w* V* q
& 06) but very limited because it's only available for Win95/98 (not NT)& E L7 |6 p# d) B4 |( u( N6 a8 o! r
as it uses the VxDCall backdoor. This detection was found in Bleem Demo.
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+ O8 N9 p% S/ F' ^" p6 B: ^, X push 0000004fh ; function 4fh$ r$ S- l; o$ x+ Z7 R
push 002a002ah ; high word specifies which VxD (VWIN32)6 E# j! u6 x( M9 J7 Q
; low word specifies which service$ L# E& \6 B' ?( e- K
(VWIN32_Int41Dispatch). ~. { R1 u" C0 \) H9 T' I
call Kernel32!ORD_001 ; VxdCall! Y0 @. Q* I+ n _4 Y. r ^1 q) i
cmp ax, 0f386h ; magic number returned by system debuggers) m `! ~1 x8 k' z( k6 ]
jz SoftICE_detected( F! { F4 l S! P9 L1 F- b% ? c
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Here again, several ways to detect it:
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BPINT 41 if ax==4f
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3 f! {8 M# s. n3 Z BPINT 30 if ax==0xF386 ; SoftICE must be loaded for this one
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5 |4 \/ y5 F7 h& n BPX Exec_PM_Int if eax==41 && edx->1c==4f && edx->10==002A002A
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( Y7 u5 e: }* p BPX Kernel32!ord_0001 if esp->4==002A002A && esp->8==4f ; slooooow!& `/ J0 g5 q0 z+ J0 e+ ^. ~$ H
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9 r! G+ {& Y6 CMethod 13
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Not a real method of detection, but a good way to know if SoftICE is
) k$ D# X- I, V: i4 F% Z+ d: Vinstalled on a computer and to locate its installation directory.
0 u' L" \& T3 e2 I' ?' X% R |1 M5 LIt is used by few softs which access the following registry keys (usually #2) :. D- |$ I, J0 _' g/ a
4 v+ s4 ] v. K% n( T-#1: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion' M3 `) D k$ e8 e
\Uninstall\SoftICE
: @+ Z v2 E' ~-#2: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\NuMega\SoftICE
f: t, u2 d$ |9 j3 @( ]-#3: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
\4 f, J1 {6 g. J% D0 I& Z\App Paths\Loader32.Exe2 G& Y. ^8 F/ l9 ~, Q3 k
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0 P; Q: [4 P+ o/ O }Note that some nasty apps could then erase all files from SoftICE directory6 L4 x g/ Q' j* q2 u! @
(I faced that once :-(9 r$ @+ l8 H6 }3 i% ^
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Useful breakpoint to detect it:! G& X2 X. ^9 M1 ~: T* F
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BPX _regopenkey if *(esp->8+0x13)=='tICE' || *(esp->8+0x37)=='tICE'
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Method 14
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5 c8 A$ P$ U9 tA call to VMM 'Test_Debug_Installed' service. As the name says, its purpose
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VMMCall Test_Debug_Installed
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This service just checks a flag.
/ V9 p, K$ T( V/ A+ w+ _5 R, s</PRE></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE> |