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* P+ L- N) |1 u ~<TD><PRE>Method 01
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This method of detection of SoftICE (as well as the following one) is( L' B- q) q7 ~; u3 H, {; c9 @; I
used by the majority of packers/encryptors found on Internet.3 M8 y* `& q" {+ l9 U$ p( [$ g7 w, k
It seeks the signature of BoundsChecker in SoftICE
% t d6 B7 u! @. U2 \! v
% |" P6 w4 c. |! m6 Y5 A# ^ mov ebp, 04243484Bh ; 'BCHK'
9 a8 W& _1 X! h& k/ M7 Z mov ax, 04h
L) |8 `! F3 I. x/ A! J; ^+ a, ]8 s int 3
1 j/ e7 U* f Y9 h/ P cmp al,4
' K2 p5 M& T' [( A8 k9 F5 _ jnz SoftICE_Detected/ V& S. j# a' ]* k( ?( K0 U
" J% Z! Z& k( N& C) J6 }/ J
___________________________________________________________________________
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Method 02# q# k: c0 X4 g9 K8 w5 j# l; I F
=========
+ {4 d' J! c* J0 y E
}" c! Y! L- P0 V, k! @Still a method very much used (perhaps the most frequent one). It is used0 M1 b1 R: J$ M9 w4 S
to get SoftICE 'Back Door commands' which gives infos on Breakpoints,
# w% o0 x Z3 t8 Yor execute SoftICE commands...
6 U8 B: C$ D' @It is also used to crash SoftICE and to force it to execute any commands
$ E+ g5 o0 d, }. o8 Z(HBOOT...) :-(( , Y3 n( I+ W1 R7 R, ^4 {. R
6 d. O' ^/ u7 S3 g1 D0 fHere is a quick description:
* w) F3 z6 z5 e. \7 T* X-AX = 0910h (Display string in SIce windows)$ a: D- m; f6 U- Q" x
-AX = 0911h (Execute SIce commands -command is displayed is ds:dx)+ ^! Q0 E* S6 |
-AX = 0912h (Get breakpoint infos)+ E/ q7 H: S/ Q6 N. V9 C: U
-AX = 0913h (Set Sice breakpoints)3 ~" X: Z2 u f4 M3 ~- p) E
-AX = 0914h (Remove SIce breakoints)
% _4 d9 a: l% ~1 H/ e5 R! n* D* H/ Q
Each time you'll meet this trick, you'll see:
0 F+ i3 ?* V. e |-SI = 4647h1 w3 g7 y* b! z9 u, [% a% m# ^
-DI = 4A4Dh
5 E( S. O V1 ]% H3 NWhich are the 'magic values' used by SoftIce.! j7 a p! j q# P8 e. k
For more informations, see "Ralf Brown Interrupt list" chapter int 03h.
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Here is one example from the file "Haspinst.exe" which is the dongle HASP0 P) F8 }( `9 @9 ` J% L
Envelope utility use to protect DOS applications:
" I# D) H4 ^9 j+ V$ q. t4 L
# X; U8 e" y! W6 G/ c+ q: H5 q5 c$ f% N3 N8 z3 n
4C19:0095 MOV AX,0911 ; execute command.
% a7 d! S( H m/ P4C19:0098 MOV DX,[BX] ; ds:dx point to the command (see below).' i3 p. ~* c; K% E$ |
4C19:009A MOV SI,4647 ; 1st magic value.
+ u8 R/ M6 a* V! \# _4C19:009D MOV DI,4A4D ; 2nd magic value.
% i' p2 e% x2 ?) b9 _4C19:00A0 INT 3 ; Int call.(if SIce is not loaded, jmp to 00AD*)
; M, H: }# d6 D% w9 a5 p) r4C19:00A1 ADD BX,02 ; BX+2 to point to next command to execute
7 s% d3 P) k5 l4 \% j4C19:00A4 INC CX
3 S' t1 _5 p+ `4C19:00A5 CMP CX,06 ; Repeat 6 times to execute
* Q3 P) }# J6 e2 y8 w- o4C19:00A8 JB 0095 ; 6 different commands.
9 x0 {! k3 a1 e" t3 c4C19:00AA JMP 0002 ; Bad_Guy jmp back.* g! \# y: A' b0 ~$ ?
4C19:00AD MOV BX,SP ; Good_Guy go ahead :) x( G6 j4 U. q4 N
9 |3 Q0 ]: L* j! r, t0 ^
The program will execute 6 different SIce commands located at ds:dx, which7 Q. d; `( q9 {" ^/ z M9 c) w, D
are: LDT, IDT, GDT, TSS, RS, and ...HBOOT.4 e& d; A7 F; s E7 |
; {) Y# D! ^# K& n6 y/ K
* the "jmp to 00ADh" is performed via an SEH if the debugger is not loaded.8 X3 Y8 A: f( S. C8 G6 j
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Method 03
- F& o! d9 B0 _=========6 N$ t5 z+ e0 R. K, Y* b4 T- l
Y% I- o0 c" `( K$ U
Less used method. It seeks the ID of SoftICE VxD via the int 2Fh/1684h$ S% ]; R. Y/ y# U( W* L! X0 k# m
(API Get entry point)
. c' u" }) Y% @, F9 m9 H # S1 X J' X3 f, m- _* |4 l' z# o8 E
+ F& }! a+ Y! J8 C$ b# g0 |# l xor di,di# h t# M* |) `* N2 g
mov es,di9 d4 e: `) d0 F4 L C3 {" v8 t4 W
mov ax, 1684h
# |8 S, U2 g& D+ B8 z, V. K" @/ g3 l( ] mov bx, 0202h ; VxD ID of winice
- p1 S8 Y4 h' c7 D! k int 2Fh
, T1 _- S7 k+ D' o# e6 l9 M/ N& Y; u mov ax, es ; ES:DI -> VxD API entry point* c% {1 h K4 ]( e o* S7 u+ l
add ax, di
0 S' g2 i o' u test ax,ax) i; \) X2 N, m- Z2 u
jnz SoftICE_Detected- e( A8 I8 T5 Z$ {
7 W. }# K: p6 D: ~$ c9 x
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Method 04
( m6 S2 U( M; L c: `! h" x" G+ E, e$ \========= c2 q8 K6 B! i( N
* ~ _% d4 D* `1 U, O u
Method identical to the preceding one except that it seeks the ID of SoftICE
% n( ^+ g1 j6 ?/ D& vGFX VxD.( x1 j8 N( ^/ R8 Q0 I* \
) B8 j5 P8 o6 Y! [ q( `
xor di,di: S, W* U" p7 s2 e$ r
mov es,di
- W3 s. J: u$ Q8 { mov ax, 1684h
; g# W. M4 \: s mov bx, 7a5Fh ; VxD ID of SIWVID- Z; L: z- ]$ ~
int 2fh# v0 c0 v) @& [; g) G3 ], \
mov ax, es ; ES:DI -> VxD API entry point7 p! W! {3 a; q, Z7 C: w
add ax, di3 z- g) r6 Z7 p/ k8 o& {
test ax,ax3 b6 W, v7 r% T
jnz SoftICE_Detected$ |, L3 x( u) q$ a" ^8 f
' `% }6 A: ?( s
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' W' N$ L1 o' W- \: |% C3 QMethod 052 p' @6 a( Z$ P8 L+ m# g6 s9 m
=========8 S7 F& _2 ?5 q! g
- v- m, j5 Y8 W5 VMethod seeking the 'magic number' 0F386h returned (in ax) by all system/ e0 O2 E- q g0 S
debugger. It calls the int 41h, function 4Fh." F. p2 h$ @+ q% C3 \2 f; L6 B
There are several alternatives.
1 }/ A; I9 |: y9 w8 T1 C* ]5 I' s; N- o) R; A/ R
The following one is the simplest:
' r) `8 }3 ?2 X/ K* B) B, ]# L" L8 N) Q) K* c1 B* M0 K
mov ax,4fh l+ V& X# `' _& n# k
int 41h
9 w8 s. y. |: C" K, p cmp ax, 0F386
& i- ^4 D' i0 }" f# l jz SoftICE_detected
$ i% _7 A& K* m, l6 l/ l. J) [6 h) V8 Y% a5 ?
. v1 k1 E, N- g- b5 kNext method as well as the following one are 2 examples from Stone's
' X8 v, v: P; y5 u" w. E"stn-wid.zip" (www.cracking.net):
# p2 U# K) {0 y3 F5 `% {$ o
2 w# \1 n8 T: ^3 d& L, o3 H" f mov bx, cs
) C s' \. @4 ^( N' L' V2 z lea dx, int41handler2
7 D: I) z4 m' b- C) W4 z xchg dx, es:[41h*4]
8 @% Q6 e- W1 X6 x7 F# o c xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]
& g, }" A) @9 X" } mov ax,4fh
: u w. x+ z, n$ d int 41h
+ o1 Y; ?' f. h9 x# E) P D3 l xchg dx, es:[41h*4]2 a' v1 N+ d \) {. s' ~/ [
xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]
. X" @% N2 J# I1 A/ G cmp ax, 0f386h
( }. |1 L+ h& z( B4 I% J% y jz SoftICE_detected
0 `8 Q. w7 ?% w0 Z8 o* l# U. r( j2 B& }: A6 F3 w2 a, I
int41handler2 PROC! U. C/ J, ~6 G6 e
iret
' ]3 \# K! G: u; x8 u5 Eint41handler2 ENDP
! g8 @& k1 z+ D! P% Y( C7 |8 P3 p" N0 I' k! U
8 ?% ^$ O. h6 S! v6 q3 ]
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Method 06
8 U1 K6 H7 d+ [( p2 r/ B, m4 X9 j=========
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2nd method similar to the preceding one but more difficult to detect:
0 `- ^; E. e: s, \ c% I8 X
9 j1 B- g- f) V0 \% X% m+ B5 o) \; r/ m* v. t0 L4 B8 t
int41handler PROC
; A# o- G* _/ `; t; x* m; X$ j mov cl,al" H# j% I( `# z
iret, ~5 Z2 r/ r! x1 P
int41handler ENDP: M4 X& p$ [4 f) x' z
2 F: K4 c& T3 ], c4 B& b- } Q! Y3 [, k
xor ax,ax. v5 H; @+ {" w9 m3 h6 T
mov es,ax/ H1 S+ z6 ^: z
mov bx, cs
/ t+ C8 F& e7 ^ Y/ z8 W5 _2 F lea dx, int41handler' @3 }" Q$ W. \. m* t; g/ Z
xchg dx, es:[41h*4]# Q2 ?) H' |5 b9 A: H
xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]: [0 M, Y; n- v* C
in al, 40h
% _* m/ s* t# U, h5 i" f3 Y xor cx,cx
* R% l2 C; R+ L% b4 Y4 p0 [ O int 41h, g. _# J8 A( j4 v T/ C' b
xchg dx, es:[41h*4]- B4 a: ^3 t% V }' {
xchg bx, es:[41h*4+2]
4 V* p( \& u9 k& G* I cmp cl,al
: X2 {7 F0 \0 N+ k7 k5 _, j jnz SoftICE_detected
- `0 b* _) I. g/ A
) d& _: u( U) z+ @! k# y3 b_________________________________________________________________________7 E1 R: m1 H }! S% B7 @6 o Z
: `/ J; D& z! W: h( I4 w
Method 07
$ o# P% v. w$ @0 s% a=========
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8 O. c& D) A" m$ e! ^; ?* ?Method of detection of the WinICE handler in the int68h (V86)9 w# Y9 y0 i5 L. Q( @- _3 |# T. a
* a' ~: G' }6 A2 H4 P
mov ah,43h T, x/ ]: O* ~' n
int 68h
2 X7 T) K% D1 C1 s$ F$ K3 x cmp ax,0F386h0 J9 d7 }5 G4 L9 [
jz SoftICE_Detected. m) H2 a% M" e
7 S( ]& P% i7 h" b5 D: g' u
" ]1 P( d2 l+ W
=> it is not possible to set a BPINT 68 with softice but you can hook a 32Bit- g! w( [9 V0 l: n
app like this:
$ R& U& [8 d% E% S3 C0 r+ ^$ @" [" v
BPX exec_int if ax==68
4 V1 D! @, b6 N7 `; S( T (function called is located at byte ptr [ebp+1Dh] and client eip is# {! k7 l7 {- z. C4 K) g! Z
located at [ebp+48h] for 32Bit apps)
4 L" v8 z. A ?* J. e' n__________________________________________________________________________* q5 O# r, A0 [+ F% i' @
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5 x4 _' ^ p$ h
Method 08% L5 n. j, J4 {4 x$ X. U3 m7 G
=========
# e% `7 x7 H9 h; |' d i2 W0 f5 v& N" T9 c. w6 [
It is not a method of detection of SoftICE but a possibility to crash the* k* v6 ~0 _- K+ D& r2 u
system by intercepting int 01h and int 03h and redirecting them to another
* C. q7 y8 K' d. s# A" Uroutine.
" {2 W7 Q2 n9 U6 ^It calls int 21h functions 25h and 35h (set/get int vector) and ds:dx points' w9 p" ?" x" ^! H9 v* U2 e0 ?
to the new routine to execute (hangs computer...)
8 ]& E, {4 w& |# s" v* [: k3 ?6 t4 A+ c2 ^
mov ah, 25h
% H! _$ c2 M/ ?6 p, C mov al, Int_Number (01h or 03h)! l% o7 J6 Z- z. [6 y- a
mov dx, offset New_Int_Routine
2 D/ t4 E K# Z+ C: Q% _0 l' s; [ int 21h9 i# G6 y4 U4 u6 R
$ {6 c, p' R0 W7 [
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Method 09% P* g; A- `& e c, {0 n
=========& b2 _3 u+ e. I% x3 M) R
7 ]7 w. Z l0 S* W: k, FThis method is closed to methods 03 and 04 (int 2Fh/1684h) but it is only
/ G1 }+ P/ K, t. Wperformed in ring0 (VxD or a ring3 app using the VxdCall).
5 m6 g9 u. K+ I0 ^$ TThe Get_DDB service is used to determine whether or not a VxD is installed
! ~, W" n: ^" n8 rfor the specified device and returns a Device Description Block (in ecx) for" P8 _. g) S2 M/ l O' I
that device if it is installed.
+ o+ R+ k% m/ l
. q% D+ \& f% f- R mov eax, Device_ID ; 202h for SICE or 7a5Fh for SIWVID VxD ID
G" ?8 K+ W1 { _0 s, `* S! S" O mov edi, Device_Name ; only used if no VxD ID (useless in our case ;-)* G& @4 {% t2 }% n# m( z) ]
VMMCall Get_DDB2 ?2 O& _, l. y' ]6 T4 {6 s
mov [DDB], ecx ; ecx=DDB or 0 if the VxD is not installed0 u0 I% |8 N1 b: {& G6 L4 l
: R* I- E- r w- @1 N; o
Note as well that you can easily detect this method with SoftICE:9 |$ A$ W2 z( }8 |6 t6 z
bpx Get_DDB if ax==0202 || ax==7a5fh
* ^ h: N, @0 d. t8 ]& x
" Q. T- _6 b) g1 L( z$ r__________________________________________________________________________. W0 j) f$ _0 j6 r n
% X( g M) _. Y$ i& y' ^9 @
Method 109 u1 i; e5 l3 s
=========# z: P/ X7 O9 q
0 A7 n1 C1 \. h+ |! N
=>Disable or clear breakpoints before using this feature. DO NOT trace with0 W4 w* r# o5 @* g) d
SoftICE while the option is enable!!( ?' @* D# N8 v" x7 `
' O5 e' B z q1 W
This trick is very efficient:
+ y! n7 T& {3 y* w% [+ _$ Oby checking the Debug Registers, you can detect if SoftICE is loaded# m" m% l8 t6 i' D: B% Q+ `
(dr7=0x700 if you loaded the soft with SoftICE loader, 0x400 otherwise) or if0 ~ ?& t5 m, i1 \* d
there are some memory breakpoints set (dr0 to dr3) simply by reading their
w) M& t" w% ^( kvalue (in ring0 only). Values can be manipulated and or changed as well
, |; g% g2 R4 O. p ?5 g3 h2 y) h0 U: S(clearing BPMs for instance) I9 D! {% U+ t, I- ^4 ^0 L- c
; I, s: [& y c: K }
__________________________________________________________________________# g$ g( C9 S7 R
( r" G' J. ]! L- |Method 119 i# A& S4 h/ d- A" O9 U
=========
! Z! [% E5 {+ F+ k0 d" ^" q# A, f' \1 J' V& ]. N
This method is most known as 'MeltICE' because it has been freely distributed; Z6 F, i9 i; {$ b
via www.winfiles.com. However it was first used by NuMega people to allow
j. L4 p8 p" N9 i4 hSymbol Loader to check if SoftICE was active or not (the code is located
: o i, }# C$ minside nmtrans.dll).
) `* n2 d/ ?9 {2 s7 j
4 s1 o: l: n+ U+ LThe way it works is very simple:" L3 e: |7 _' L) ]% m8 P9 _( \
It tries to open SoftICE drivers handles (SICE, SIWVID for Win9x, NTICE for
; @5 A6 F8 U) MWinNT) with the CreateFileA API.3 l8 f- x# E2 }. U, h
. t) p' Q0 ^" h( Q9 U% y9 T
Here is a sample (checking for 'SICE'):; H3 M9 q) x$ V" z7 y7 L) e
3 M3 U2 ~1 w. r
BOOL IsSoftIce95Loaded(): Y$ g$ l* c; t$ p( T% ]+ r
{# Q8 B2 v' J& t M; I j, l9 O
HANDLE hFile;
$ z( ]% N* t* T) f$ C6 `/ G hFile = CreateFile( "\\\\.\\SICE", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,; L: |$ }/ @6 G
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
( e8 L7 h$ i/ b Y! T$ t% T8 o NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);0 P: [& K$ d: h& E
if( hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )$ Z+ `) r6 d' j* h4 x) [: {
{4 b" ~9 q) T! A [
CloseHandle(hFile);* h2 e6 \7 s& k9 a" t
return TRUE;+ T# X) l2 a& H9 o! Z
}0 I0 f$ w# o+ b" X4 T# x
return FALSE;
5 S1 f5 _5 m8 ]# C! p}
) c5 b6 K. |- }9 G E, K, [3 k/ |, ?; K. E1 q3 c9 q7 i
Although this trick calls the CreateFileA function, don't even expect to be; N; ^8 `% p' c# A6 t
able to intercept it by installing a IFS hook: it will not work, no way!0 {& a! f4 e2 |2 g' i/ J+ S
In fact, after the call to CreateFileA it will get through VWIN32 0x001F
8 @5 x8 U/ }4 M$ t" ^2 n) zservice _VWIN32_ReleaseWin32Mutex (via Kernel32!ORD_0001/VxDCall function)# ? V6 `# d7 H& a4 t
and then browse the DDB list until it find the VxD and its DDB_Control_Proc
$ n% T5 Z$ u% _/ I: U: ^! nfield.
`, ~% q) R: u7 oIn fact, its purpose is not to load/unload VxDs but only to send a
( x8 L( D9 {6 o/ K* U; f9 `* S" cW32_DEVICEIOCONTROL (0x23) control message (DIOC_OPEN and DIOC_CLOSEHANDLE)( ^! Y1 B2 N) m9 v8 h$ S e
to the VxD Control_Dispatch proc (how the hell a shareware soft could try
5 a+ U% ]. q& [. Z1 c4 \1 n( fto load/unload a non-dynamically loadable driver such as SoftICE ;-).
, w8 D1 j1 H7 t+ v- zIf the VxD is loaded, it will always clear eax and the Carry flag to allow K1 i& N9 K5 M
its handle to be opened and then, will be detected.
) q! E m- }/ h. J- _* P; c: [You can check that simply by hooking Winice.exe control proc entry point
7 k+ m, ]9 l7 S8 B8 v# K9 {* i6 jwhile running MeltICE., j' |8 N/ m+ f3 W+ u0 P
$ z3 _8 I( n; q# R' e: g% U5 R( Z+ [. I% Z' f& j$ p7 s
00401067: push 00402025 ; \\.\SICE
! r6 {. A+ @6 U; g 0040106C: call CreateFileA+ ~* @& Y5 P& h' x7 A2 m
00401071: cmp eax,-001 @% {3 H% z1 O$ N" x J
00401074: je 004010911 V1 [2 \7 c* S5 v9 n
; ]; O0 w) R% s& Z" F, M% \5 i( J# a' Q8 w
There could be hundreds of BPX you could use to detect this trick.
5 f1 b, m( g3 ^, C, }- X# {# f-The most classical one is:& p* G9 L! x" T7 [+ Q2 \) |" _
BPX CreateFileA if *(esp->4+4)=='SICE' || *(esp->4+4)=='SIWV' ||
" k. {8 c: i4 v *(esp->4+4)=='NTIC'
$ Z0 c- o4 C. }# G+ V4 K* U$ ]. g/ U# S7 N( l' r. s
-The most exotic ones (could be very slooooow :-(
1 l2 A `) S; c7 [+ l BPINT 30 if eax==002A001F && (*edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV') & d/ @- y4 ~, O! f: E: F/ q& }
;will break 3 times :-(
: ^# O: `1 b9 h: k% ]2 f2 g# _, a/ E# } Z a" W
-or (a bit) faster: C0 U. Q1 k* a! n% {0 X. ?
BPINT 30 if (*edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV')
/ f3 H# e. ~* |' z+ J. |
$ @" n# b5 W8 ^ z9 P. p BPX KERNEL32!ORD_0001 if *edi=='SICE' || *edi=='SIWV' 1 B# T) T1 I$ X' c. A; J# W# F
;will break 3 times :-($ X- @6 i9 T( H6 o6 \
( C( m! h5 x# E: W% j& P+ m- \. H-Much faster:
) k0 x$ C% h& V1 U) O BPX VMM_GetDDBList if eax->3=='SICE' || eax->3=='SIWV'
+ [3 u; d0 D* }- H8 X9 ~! n* R: H, ]+ w
Note also that some programs (like AZPR3.00) use de old 16-bit _lopen1 r' E- Y' Y# ?6 [4 k
function to do the same job:# e! V6 s8 t7 R: N3 ~0 U: W; ]4 k
' [5 x+ y U! k% H% ]# C
push 00 ; OF_READ
1 T( V2 @' u+ [ mov eax,[00656634] ; '\\.\SICE',0
, {$ Q& R2 n+ v* i/ E/ I' a7 I/ X, F push eax4 ~- x9 G& N: ^9 W- @" [2 | z$ P
call KERNEL32!_lopen ?4 N% [ P, ]2 W' n) i
inc eax, @0 r; s3 e/ x( @- C$ H
jnz 00650589 ; detected5 e5 |7 _$ D# w. z) w
push 00 ; OF_READ& g' w* ~+ ~3 t _5 y
mov eax,[00656638] ; '\\.\SICE'
9 o4 u+ F* s; [0 }8 n1 X* i push eax
- j i3 o2 P, r( ] call KERNEL32!_lopen( O/ @1 y. L. Z w: H
inc eax' _0 E9 B9 t6 N2 d+ P4 F( Z
jz 006505ae ; not detected: v. a9 g& G" J) Q- X4 _1 \
I! r4 |* Y4 C" X5 x# t
' X+ b- \! C) y7 [( A
__________________________________________________________________________! _/ X/ M" U5 {8 F
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Method 12
0 n2 j$ M- l" L! Y* G7 P=========
. u B! d& [8 e( }: C, ?& X
* K* {# j6 {) P2 h5 M# v" X; k5 `2 CThis trick is similar to int41h/4fh Debugger installation check (code 05
M: _6 z. X" ?2 k4 ]& 06) but very limited because it's only available for Win95/98 (not NT)
+ g1 {. Z6 J1 J+ fas it uses the VxDCall backdoor. This detection was found in Bleem Demo.
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/ H8 J9 [0 F: y. F push 0000004fh ; function 4fh5 [$ A/ f) D6 N- u% a% g, U
push 002a002ah ; high word specifies which VxD (VWIN32)
: k) }! o. ^7 {% q% V ; low word specifies which service2 m( w" [- z/ @$ \1 c6 x, J: D
(VWIN32_Int41Dispatch)
. ?5 h4 U+ f: R6 i. D% p& ~ call Kernel32!ORD_001 ; VxdCall
4 v _4 n7 k( \: I M0 R, B+ l cmp ax, 0f386h ; magic number returned by system debuggers/ r! q0 e r& ]- P. ]
jz SoftICE_detected. y7 m4 A. L$ T! ^7 l j+ {5 m& ~# }
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Here again, several ways to detect it:! n0 v0 i8 l R, X3 T. x
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BPINT 41 if ax==4f
+ x" s4 } A5 r- k
# g& G& W3 z, f2 N8 N1 P" e0 T: f' i BPINT 30 if ax==0xF386 ; SoftICE must be loaded for this one
% O( d# @! m( y
; o, u+ D9 ^) L$ O& P- w* N BPX Exec_PM_Int if eax==41 && edx->1c==4f && edx->10==002A002A9 s. ~1 h! X" p5 S
: {0 A* c' {9 H# g' ^ n BPX Kernel32!ord_0001 if esp->4==002A002A && esp->8==4f ; slooooow!7 Q- L5 e, z" b; H: s! P& D
% D. T: a6 n$ K" k, M; i2 W0 @2 @* q& B__________________________________________________________________________
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Method 13
3 m* [5 H! O; A3 z=========' X2 B1 i( d. w6 h+ |0 k
/ o3 |9 O# ]+ M% x
Not a real method of detection, but a good way to know if SoftICE is5 C o% r+ D" Y" @) h8 Q* Z
installed on a computer and to locate its installation directory.
$ I" L9 s; V9 R. i. H: vIt is used by few softs which access the following registry keys (usually #2) :
. n2 x7 I' o5 i Z9 {
8 h5 \6 F# |$ a+ o-#1: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion$ l; [; N, p+ w* R; D8 }* R/ X/ l
\Uninstall\SoftICE, N- R4 J( S$ h7 [ V2 J
-#2: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\NuMega\SoftICE
9 h4 m; D( T* ?; \% c. ^! _-#3: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion) a0 L1 N: s% h R+ f
\App Paths\Loader32.Exe5 }% r' I+ H- z; a: y3 y' W
$ ?! X$ I7 l7 \
4 d9 `. ~. m/ R5 v+ q3 R
Note that some nasty apps could then erase all files from SoftICE directory
# G+ Q" c( P: v- d- b. c4 r6 Y4 B5 ~(I faced that once :-(
6 d1 g- J, r/ f4 G ]" \/ t" A- j- s- j
Useful breakpoint to detect it:
5 k. ]4 \2 A p5 X; R
! e: ]$ m/ o$ N6 H& n BPX _regopenkey if *(esp->8+0x13)=='tICE' || *(esp->8+0x37)=='tICE'
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__________________________________________________________________________) [" ?9 _) c4 m2 I6 u: B0 n
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" h1 @1 S) h2 zMethod 14 7 h/ }& U5 `: [1 w6 S
=========; }# D: M/ e4 c% C* Y
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A call to VMM 'Test_Debug_Installed' service. As the name says, its purpose, d* j8 C; f3 K4 r/ y
is to determines whether a debugger is running on your system (ring0 only).) k1 G& [+ G/ ^' g6 V3 _
( E3 ~% W8 U* N: k3 m& p0 v9 Y! C VMMCall Test_Debug_Installed
& Z5 o# u+ ^" @( @8 v$ O3 E je not_installed
6 W- m7 {, q0 D8 ]& L# z# I, N# W( q
This service just checks a flag.
3 d! T' |" {; b2 g</PRE></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE> |